In Irkutsk, the split in the liberal opposition was discussed against the backdrop of a scandalous film about the “wild nineties”

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Associates of Alexei Navalny They released a film about the 1990s, about how corruption arose in Russia. For this they were accused of reproducing communist rhetoric. Experts believe that the new liberal opposition is trying to break with the politicians of the last century. The film was commented on by Irkutsk political scientists, historians, and politicians.

The film caused a scandal and a certain split in the ranks of the non-systemic Russian opposition. Alexey Navalny and earlier spoke out about the problem of the 1990s in Russian political discourse. In August 2023, he wrote a confessional manifesto, “My Fear and Loathing,” in which he pointed out that the country’s problems were rooted in the 1990s. As a result, in Russia, according to Navalny, a corrupt political regime was established. Moreover, Navalny criticized the pseudo-free media for participating in the fraudulent 1996 presidential elections.

So far, two episodes of the film have been released: the first is about the seizure of power in Russia in the 1990s, and the second is about oligarchs and elections “stolen” from the country.

  • Political scientist, candidate of historical sciences Sergey Shmidt emphasizes that in this way the new opposition is trying to expand the ranks of its supporters:

– The very content of the first two episodes of the film, in my opinion, makes no sense to discuss; those dissatisfied with this film did not find a single factual error in it, except for the years of peak popularity of the Tender May group. As the author herself said singers*, if this is the only factual oversight, then the film can be considered flawless. The film is criticized for its placement of accents, for the imbalance of these accents – this is what I based my criticism on Alexey Venediktov*. But this film is not a journalistic investigation, it is not a historical documentary, it is a political declaration of its authors, so dissatisfaction with the accents is inevitable, and in itself cannot be a drawback. Moreover, I will say that an imbalance of emphasis is inevitable both in journalistic work and in historical research, so this is “taste” criticism, that is, criticism of “nothing”.

It is interesting to try to answer the question of why this film appeared and why it appeared now, when the opposition, having lost its leader, is experiencing an obvious crisis. I have three possible answers, and I think the final answer consists of these three elements.

First. We are witnessing a generational conflict in the opposition community. This is not very common, since usually the conflict of generations is reflected in the confrontation between revolutionaries and conservatives, however, the revolutionary environment is not immune from it. Consider, for example, the conflict Lenin and his actual teacher Plekhanov with comrades. This was also a generational conflict. Oppositionists of 30-40 years of age are tired of the old people; they simply do not see any practical sense in cooperation with the old people. This documentary statement is an excellent way to disassociate yourself from “ballast”.

Second. We are dealing with an instrument of struggle for a place under the “opposition sun”, that is, for moral, informational and financial support of a variety of structures interested in a change of power in Russia. The film identifies those who are responsible for the “crimes” of the authorities and who should be removed from the balance sheet, regardless of the fact that they are in conflict with the Kremlin. Apparently, first of all, this is a disengagement with Khodorkovsky* And Chubaisthis is the assessment of Alexey Venediktov*, and I agree with it.

Third. An attempt is being made to expand the circle of opposition supporters. The fact that the opposition did not really express its attitude towards the 90s turned millions of people in Russia against it. Apparently, the current young generation of the opposition has realized this mistake. I will express a paradoxical thought: it may very well be that a negative assessment of the 90s is the only platform on which it is possible to unite the divided Russian society, to unite supporters of the government with its radical opponents. If the opposition had understood this in 2011-2012, the fate of the so-called Bolotnaya Square could have turned out differently. Now it may be too late, but the very fact that the opposition realized that the 90s cannot be glorified in a country in which the absolute majority hated them is quite remarkable. Let’s see what comes of this attempt to attract the sympathy of those who supported Putin.

To be fair, I note that the assumption of those who consider the filmmakers to be collaborating with the presidential administration or secretly carrying out orders from the intelligence services also has a right to exist.

  • Historian Mikhail Sosnovsky reminds that the change in the opposition’s attitude towards the 1990s did not begin yesterday, and will intensify:

– For a long time, the politics of memory of both loyalists and liberal oppositionists was determined by the opposition of the nineties and Putin’s rule, only with different polar assessments of these two periods.

However, somewhere at the turn of the tens and twenties, a creeping revision of the attitude towards the nineties began within the liberal camp. First there was a discussion of documentaries and books dedicated to the 1996 elections, from which it turned out that Yeltsin was then able to win only due to a behind-the-scenes conspiracy with the oligarchs at the expense of “shares-for-shares auctions”, administrative resources and a shameless campaign of total propaganda. Then the discussion of 1993 was brought up as another reference point – Yeltsin, as a representative of the executive branch in his constitutional conflict with the Supreme Council as the embryo of the legislative branch, preferred to resolve the matter not through long and tedious compromise negotiations, but through emergency decrees, mobilization of security forces and the shooting of the White House from tanks . The result was a super-presidential Constitution that placed the president above all other branches of government.

Let me emphasize that in this criticism of the nineties there may not even be a stereotypical “leftist” agenda – the very bloody establishment of an unusually strong executive power with the potential to transition to dictatorial power, tied to behind-the-scenes conspiracies, administrative resources and manipulation of public opinion raises doubts, if not about “liberalism” , then certainly in the “democratic” nature of such a regime.

The current film is a continuation of this revision of the 90s in the liberal camp, but takes it to a new level. All of the above examples were the lot of a large, but still quantitatively limited reading and professionally reflective public. An investigation under a well-known brand raises this topic for millions of ordinary viewers. And this is its value, that, with all its manipulations and omissions, it actualizes the public discussion around the 90s and shifts it towards the consensus that I personally subjectively consider correct. Solzhenitsyn at one time he argued that there was no “Stalinism” – there was “Leninism” modernized for specific historical circumstances. So it is here: there is no “Putinism” – there is “Yeltsinism” modernized for a different historical context.

At the same time, it should be realized that the generation of liberals who were the protagonists in the nineties (the biting word “beneficiaries” has now been updated) will, purely psychologically, never accept this revision – this is natural and, perhaps, even normal. But they are not eternal (like all people and all political regimes in general), so a change in attitude towards the 90s from plus to minus on the part of people with liberal views seems to me only a matter of time and a change of generations.

  • Ex-chairman of IRO PARNAS Mikhail Vasiliev I am sure that for an objective analysis of the past of the new Russia, it is necessary to carefully study the process of building its administrative institutions:

– I consider the work of analyzing the recent history of Russia very important. It is really useful for us to understand where those forks were where Russia could turn in a different direction, so that now people here live richer, freer and longer. And in this sense, these kinds of films are very important.

I am inclined to agree with the authors’ general thesis that the era of Vladimir Putin is a direct continuation of the era of Boris Yeltsin and is based on the foundation laid under Yeltsin. At the same time, it seems to me that institutional foundations are much more important. I am sure that the key turning points were the introduction of hypertrophied functions of the president into the Constitution and the decision of the constitutional court on a unitary tax system. Both of these forks occurred under Yeltsin, but he is responsible for only one of them. But the construction of a house, even with signs of corruption, hardly marks a turning point in history.

At the same time, it is useful to remind people that we all combine egoistic and altruistic principles. And therefore there is no such decision that we will remove the bad king and choose a good one for life. Whatever king we choose, sooner or later he will also have skeletons in his closet and incorrectly purchased apartments. Therefore, we think more about rulers coming and going, and the prosecutor appointed by each subsequent ruler thoroughly investigating the activities of his predecessor. And judges should not provide services to rulers, but should administer justice, including in relation to the rulers themselves. So far I have not seen this institutional line in the film. But maybe she will appear later?

  • Journalist Andrey Kalinkin admits that in the future the left and liberal opposition in Russia will have joint projects:

– The thesis voiced in the film that today’s Russia is not a break with the 90s, but their logical development, in my opinion, is absolutely correct. This is where not only corruption or the rollback of political freedoms, which began with the dispersal of May Day with “democratizer” batons and the shooting at parliament in 1993, originates, but also the current geopolitical conflict. The nomenklatura surrendered to the USSR in order to replace state dachas and “Seagulls” with palaces and yachts, and hoped that former opponents would accept it into their club. And when it turned out that no one was waiting for them in NATO, they took the path of creating their own alliance.

This leads to a disappointing conclusion for liberals: it is impossible to break with the 90s in half. In order for there to be no oligarchs, so that the democratic and social rights of citizens are not an empty phrase, we will have to return to socialism. Not in its bureaucratic late Soviet version, but nonetheless.

The reasons for the controversy surrounding the film are also clear. The film’s authors are accused of “Zyuganov’s rhetoric” by those for whom freedom of private enterprise is more valuable than freedom of speech or assembly. These people are still ready to applaud Yeltsin’s tanks and shout “Crush the reptile!” And the “leftward movement” of the rhetoric of the Pevchikh team* is probably partly due to the fact that they are also targeting “angry citizens” who, until the 2010s, were part of the social base of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, but are “leaking away” from the party (in my opinion , due to its lack of opposition).

By the way, what’s interesting is that while the liberal wing of the opposition is splitting in relation to the 90s, discussions are raging among non-systemic leftists about the extent and forms of interaction with liberals. Perhaps, in the foreseeable future, the result of this counter-movement will be a tactical alliance?

Mandatory markings: * – in the Register of Foreign Agents in the Russian Federation; ** – in the Register of Prohibited Extremist Organizations in the Russian Federation; *** – in the Register of Prohibited Terrorist Organizations in the Russian Federation; **** – in the Register of Undesirable Organizations in the Russian Federation

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